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Abstract. The model of a cooperative fuzzy game is interpreted
as both a population game and a cooperative investment game.
Three types of core-like solutions induced by these interpretations
are introduced and investigated. The interpretation of a game as
a population game allows us to de¯ne sub-games. We show that,
unlike the well-known Shapley-Shubik theorem on market games
[13], there might be a population game such that each of its sub-
games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market
game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a population
game needs to be also homogeneous. We also discuss some special
classes of population games such as convex games, exact games,
homogeneous games and additive games.
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The theory of transferable utility cooperative games usually deals
with the problem of ¯nding solutions to scenarios where every subset
(coalition) of a ¯nite set of players has a given value. Thus, if a coalition
is identi¯ed with its characteristic vector, a (TU) cooperative game is a
real-valued function de¯ned on the vertices of the unit cube. Aubin [1],
[2] suggested to expand the set of possible coalitions to the entire cube
and thereby enable the players to choose any level of participation in a
coalition, not just whether to participate or not. As a consequence, the
domain of the game is extended to the entire unit cube. These kind of
games are called cooperative fuzzy games.
As in the theory of classic cooperative games, solution concepts for
cooperative fuzzy games took two main directions. Aubin [1], [2]
de¯ned the core of a fuzzy game to be the set of all vectors x =
(x1;:::;xn) 2 I R
n that satisfy
Pn
i=1 xi = v(1;:::;1) and
Pn
i=1 xici ¸
v(c1;:::;cn) for all fuzzy coalition (c1;:::;cn). The logic behind the
de¯nition is that, if xi is understood as the per-unit reward for agent
i, then a core element x is resistant to the claims of any (fuzzy) coali-
tion. Other papers discussing cores of fuzzy games include Butnariu
[7] where a di®erent de¯nition of the core appears, and Branzei et al.
[6] where cores of convex fuzzy games are studied.
Another direction taken in the analysis of fuzzy games is that of
a value. Several attempts have been made to axiomatically derive a
value function for fuzzy games, similar to the Shapley value in discrete
cooperative games [10]. Papers in this direction include Aubin [1], [2],
Butnariu [7], Billera and Heath [4] and Tsurumi et al. [14].
In this paper we consider a model similar to that of fuzzy games. Its
interpretation, however, is rather di®erent. Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be a
¯nite set representing the types of agents in a large population. There is
a continuum of agents of each type and Qi ¸ 0 is the size of type i (i =
1;:::;n) agents. The entire population is, therefore, represented by a
positive vector Q = (Q1;:::;Qn), and possible coalitions are identi¯ed
with the vectors that are (coordinate-wise) smaller than Q: F(Q) =
fc = (c1;:::;cn) 2 I R
n; 0 · ci · Qi; i = 1;:::;ng. If ci represents the
amount of agents of type i (i = 1;:::;n) that participate in a coalition,
then the total worth of c = (c1;:::;cn) is given by the real number v(c).
A population game is, therefore, a pair (v;Q), where Q is a vector all
of whose coordinates are non-negative, and v is a real valued function
1de¯ned on the cube F(Q). Such a model may also be interpreted
di®erently. Assume that there are n interacting agents, and that, for
every i = 1;:::;n, the amount of resources available for agent i is
Qi ¸ 0 (this can be time, money, etc.). Each agent can choose to invest
any fraction of his resources in a joint project. If ci (0 · ci · Qi) is
the amount of resources that agent i invests, then the total value of
the project is v(c1;:::;cn).
While the de¯nition of the core proposed by Aubin [1], [2] is plau-
sible in the context of population games, it is not when the model
is understood as an investment game. Indeed, assume that in an in-
vestment game (v;Q), the allocation x is blocked by the investment
c = (c1;:::;cn). That is,
Pn
i=1 xici < v(c). In this case, each agent i is
left with Qi ¡ ci uninvested dollars. It might be that, no matter how
the agents invest this remainder, the total worth of their investment
is smaller than that guaranteed by x. Thus, from a comprehensive
perspective on the entire investment x is a stable allocation.
The above argument implies that, in the context of investment games,
a core allocation should take into account the total value of investing
the entire resources, and not only a fraction of it, possibly in several
projects. For that reason we introduce the comprehensive core of an
investment game. An allocation x is in the comprehensive core of the
game (v;Q) if no subset of agents can do better than what is obtained
by x, no matter how they choose to invest their resources.
According to the traditional de¯nition, a core element x should be
feasible in the sense that
Pn
i=1 xiQi equals the worth of the grand
coalition v(Q). When interpreting the model as a population game, the
grand coalition is comprised of a large number of agents. It is therefore
natural to consider situations where splitting the entire population into
a few smaller groups is more e±cient than forming the grand coalition.
This leads us to de¯ne another variant of the core, the split core. The
split core is the set of stable allocations which are feasible when the
population splits optimally into several sub-populations.
As mentioned above, the majority of the existing literature interprets
the coordinates of a `fuzzy coalition' as the participation levels of the
players in the coalition. Therefore, it was usually assumed that Q is
the vector which equals 1 in all of its coordinates. However, under
the interpretation of a population game, it is natural to consider other
vectors Q. This allows us to de¯ne the subgames of a given population
game in an obvious way: The subgame induced by a sub-population d
2is de¯ned by the same v restricted to the subset F(d) that consists of
all coalitions that are smaller than or equal to d.
We introduce market games in the context of a large population.
Suppose that each agent in the economy has an initial endowment of
production factors and a production function. Furthermore, suppose
that there are ¯nitely many types in the economy, where a type is
characterized by the endowment and the production function the agent
is endowed with. This situation naturally induces a population game,
called a market game: the worth of a coalition is the maximal product
achievable by reallocating the initial resources among the agents of the
coalition. It turns out the the core of any subgame of a market game
is non-empty. However, unlike Shapley and Shubik [13], the inverse is
generally incorrect. There are population games such that each of their
subgames has a non-empty core, while they are not market games.
A population game is homogeneous if multiplying the size of a coali-
tion by a positive factor would multiply its worth by the same factor.
We show that a population game is a market game if and only if the core
of each of its subgames is not empty and moreover, it is homogeneous.
Some special classes of population games are also discussed. An in-
teresting class of cooperative games is that of convex games (Shapley,
[12]). The de¯nition of convex games was extended to fuzzy games by
Branzey et al. [6]. They proved that, as in the discrete case, convex
fuzzy games have a non-empty core. We explore more properties of
convex population games, notably that every bounded convex popula-
tion game is continuous in the interior of the domain (convexity of the
game does not imply convexity of the function v, so this is not a trivial
result).
Another interesting class is that of exact games (Schmeidler, [9]).
The de¯nition of exactness is adapted to population games, and a char-
acterization of exact population games is provided. It is also shown that
every subgame of a population game is exact if and only if the game
is linear. This is in contrast with discrete cooperative games where
exactness of every subgame is equivalent to convexity of the original
game.
After formally presenting the model and introducing some basic tools
in Section 2, we discuss the various core concepts in Section 3. The
(standard) core, the split core and the comprehensive core are formally
de¯ned, and we characterize non-emptiness of each one of them. The
characterization makes use of several operators de¯ned on population
3games. These operators can be seen as analogous to the totally balanced
cover operator in (classical) cooperative games (see Azrieli and Lehrer,
[3]). Market games are discussed in Section 4.
In Sections 5 we deal with convex games. In Section 6 we discuss
exact games. Section 7 refers to the simple case where there are no
externalities. Thus, the worth of a coalition is the sum of the contri-
butions of its maximally homogeneous (i.e., consisting of agents of one
type) sub-coalitions. The simple structure of additive games allows us
to simplify some of the results of the previous sections. Final remarks
and open problems are given in Section 8.
2. The model and preliminary results
2.1. Basic notation and de¯nitions.
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be a ¯nite set. In the context of population
games, N will be the set of di®erent types in the population. When
we discuss investment games, N will be interpreted as the set of agents
participating in the game. For any vector with non-negative coordi-
nates1 Q = (Q1;:::;Qn) 2 I R
n, let F(Q) = fc 2 I R
n; 0 · c · Qg.
When the model is interpreted as a cooperative investment game,
Qi will be the amount of resources available for player i. Each player
can choose to invest any part of his resources. Thus, F(Q) is the set
of all possible joint investments (or the investment set). On the other
hand, if N represents the set of types in a given population, then Qi is
some measurement of the number of players of type i. A coalition is,
therefore, a vector c = (c1;:::;cn) in F(Q) where ci is the number of
agents of type i that participate in the coalition. Notice that F(Q) is
a compact and convex polyhedral set.
For every subset S µ N, we denote by QS the vector which coincides
with Q on the members of S and equals 0 out of S. That is Qi
S = Qi
if i 2 S and Qi
S = 0 otherwise.
De¯nition 1. A cooperative investment game/population game is a
pair (v;Q) such that:
(1) Q 2 Rn and Q ¸ 0;
(2) v : F(Q) ! R is a real valued function de¯ned on F(Q) such
that v(0) = 0.
1For two vectors s;t in I R
n, s · t (resp. s << t) means that si · ti (resp.
si < ti) for i = 1;:::;n.
4We will use both terms, population games and investment games, to
refer to such a pair (v;Q).
For any vector c 2 I R
n, we denote by jcj the l1 norm of c, that is
jcj =
Pn
i=1 jcij. Since we only deal with vectors all of whose coordinates
are non-negative, we have that jc + dj = jcj + jdj for any c;d 2 F(Q).
The n ¡ 1-dimensional simplex in I R
n is denoted by ¢. That is, ¢ =
f(q1;:::;qn) 2 I R
n;
Pn
i=1 qi = 1; qi ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;ng.
2.2. Some operators over population games.
Let Q 2 I R
n; Q ¸ 0, be ¯xed throughout this subsection. We will
make use of the following de¯nition:
De¯nition 2. (i) A function g : F(Q) ! I R is Super Additive (SA)
if, for every c;d 2 F(Q) such that c+d 2 F(Q), v(c)+v(d) · v(c+d).
(ii) A function g : F(Q) ! I R is called Strongly Super Additive (SSA)
if, for every c 2 F(Q) the equation
PL
j=1 ¸jcj = c where L 2 N; ¸j ¸ 0
and cj 2 F(c); j = 1;:::;L implies that g(c) ¸
PL
j=1 ¸jg(cj).
We next de¯ne several operators over the class of bounded population
games that will turn out to be useful in the upcoming sections.
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¸SdS = d; ¸S ¸ 0; S µ N
ª
:
Sav is the super additive cover of v. SSav is the strong super additive
cover of v. Dav is the discrete (strong) super additive cover of v (recall
that dS is the vector with di
S = di if i 2 S and di
S = 0 otherwise).
Some properties of these operators appear in Lemmas 8 and 9 in the
Appendix.
Any population game induces a function on ¢ in the following way.
De¯nition 4. Let (v;Q) be a bounded population game. De¯ne uv;Q :
¢ ! I R [ f+1g by uv;Q(q) = supf
v(c)
jcj ; c 2 F(Q); q = c
jcjg.
5Example 1.
Let n = 2, Q = (2;2), and for any c 2 F(Q) let v(c) = (c1+c2)2. Fix
q = (q1;1¡q1) 2 ¢. In order to compute uv;Q(q), we need to maximize
(c1+c2)2
c1+c2 = c1 + c2 with the constrains that c 2 F(Q) and c1
c1+c2 = q1. A
simple computation yields uv;Q(q) = 2
1¡minfq1;1¡q1g.
De¯nition 5. Assume that uv;Q is bounded. The concavi¯cation of
uv;Q, denoted Cavuv;Q, is de¯ned as the minimum of all concave func-
tions g : ¢ ! R such that g(q) ¸ uv;Q(q) for every q 2 ¢.
Cavuv;Q is a concave function as a minimum of concave functions.
Moreover, if uv;Q is continuous, then since ¢ is a convex polygon,
Cavuv;Q is also continuous (see Laraki, [8]).












®i = 1; and
(iv) qi 2 ¢; i = 1;:::;n + 1
o
:
The proof is postponed to the Appendix.
3. Three types of core-like solutions
In this section we give various de¯nitions for the stability of an allo-
cation, all of them inspired by the core concept in classic cooperative
games. The ¯rst and the second de¯nitions seem more natural when
the model is interpreted as a population game, while the third can be
justi¯ed when the model is understood as a cooperative investment
game.
The set of allocations satisfying the ¯rst de¯nition is simply called
the core. This is the standard de¯nition that was used in the theory of
cooperative fuzzy games, and it is discussed in subsection 3.1. However,
we claim that in the context of population games the set of stable
allocations might be larger than the core. The reason is that, when the
population is large, it seems natural to consider what can be achieved
6by splitting into several smaller `communities' rather than the worth of
the entire population. We therefore de¯ne the split core of a population
game to be the set of stable allocations of the worth of some partition
of Q and not necessarily of the worth of Q itself. The split core is
discussed in subsection 3.2.
When dealing with cooperative investment games, the two previous
de¯nitions are hard to justify. In subsection 3.3 we de¯ne the compre-
hensive core of a game to be the set of allocations of v(Q) which are
immune to deviations of any subset of players S µ N, no matter how
the players in S invest their resources QS.
3.1. The core.
De¯nition 6. The core of the game (v;Q), denoted core(v;Q), is the
set of vectors x = (x1;:::;xn) such that2
(1) xQ = v(Q); and
(2) xd ¸ v(d) for any coalition d 2 F(Q).
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) core(v;Q) is non-empty.
(2) uv;Q is bounded from above and SSav(Q) = v(Q)





Proof. (1) ) (2) Let x 2 core(v;Q) and assume that the equation PL
j=1 ¸jcj = Q holds, where cj 2 F(Q), and ¸j ¸ 0; j = 1;:::;L.




j=1 ¸jv(cj), and therefore v(Q) =
SSav(Q). Also, since for every c 2 F(Q)
v(c)
jcj · xc
jcj, it follows that uv;Q
is bounded from above.
(2) ) (3) This is a consequence of Lemma 1. Indeed, since v(Q) =






jQj, where cj 2 F(Q); ®j ¸
0; j = 1;:::;L and
PL























(3) ) (1) Cavuv;Q is concave over ¢. Let x 2 I R
n be a supporting
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Therefore, x 2 core(v;Q).
The de¯nition of the core is due to Aubin [1], [2]. However, his
characterization of non-emptiness of the core is only for the case where
the function v is homogeneous on F(Q). This is the case where v(q) =
jqjuv;Q(
q
jqj) for every coalition q 6= 0.
3.2. The split core.
A core allocation x needs to satisfy two conditions. The ¯rst is that
x should be feasible:
Pn
i=1 xiQi is equal to the worth of the grand
coalition v(Q). In a population game the grand coalition consists of a
large number of small agents. It might occur that splitting the entire
population into a few smaller groups is more e±cient than forming the
grand coalition. In the split core, we are about to de¯ne, feasibility of
an allocation is meant in a broader sense than in the core. An allocation
is feasible if there is a partition of the grand coalition optimally into
several sub-coalitions c1;:::;cL, such that
Pn
i=1 xiQi equals the sum of
values of these sub-coalitions,
PL
i=1 v(ci): Formally,
De¯nition 7. The split core of a population game (v;Q), denoted
S ¡ core(v;Q), consists of all vectors x 2 I R
n, such that there exist
L 2 N and coalitions c1;:::;cL µ F(Q) that satisfy
(1)
PL




(3) For any coalition d 2 F(Q), xd ¸ v(d).
Here, the split core allocation x is resistent to any blocking coalition,
as in the core. However, it might be that xQ > v(Q), meaning that x is
not available if the grand coalition is formed. When the entire popula-
tion splits into the coalitions c1;:::;cL, the total worth is increased and





i=1 ci = Q, then for any i = 1;:::;L,
xci = v(ci). This means that x is available for each of the coalitions ci
separately.
By de¯nition, we have that core(v;Q) µ S ¡ core(v;Q). Therefore,
Theorem 1 provides su±cient conditions for non-emptiness of the split
8core. The following theorem characterizes games with non-empty split
core.
Theorem 2. Let (v;Q) be a population game. Then S ¡ core(v;Q) is
non-empty if and only if SSav(Q) = Sav(Q).
Proof. Consider the auxiliary population game (v0;Q) de¯ned by v0(c) =
v(c) if c 6= Q and v0(Q) = Sav(Q). By the de¯nition of the split core
we have that S ¡ core(v;Q) = core(v0;Q). By Theorem 1, core(v0;Q) is
not empty if and only if v0(Q) = SSav0(Q). However, v0(Q) = Sav(Q)
by de¯nition, and since v and v0 coincide on F(Q) n fQg it is obvious
that SSav(Q) = SSav0(Q). Therefore, v0(Q) = SSav0(Q) is equivalent
to Sav(Q) = SSav(Q) hence the theorem.
In the following example the game (v;Q) has an empty core but a
non-empty split core.
Example 2.





jqj) for every q 6= 0. Therefore, uv;Q is just the restriction
of v to ¢, that is uv;Q(q) = (q1)2 for any q = (q1;q2) 2 ¢. Since uv;Q is
convex on ¢ it follows that Cavuv;Q((1=2;1=2)) > uv;Q((1=2;1=2)) =
v(Q)
jQj and therefore, by Theorem 1, (v;Q) has an empty core. On the
other hand, SSav(Q) = Sav(Q), so by Theorem 2 the split core of
(v;Q) is not empty.
3.3. The comprehensive core.
When interpreted as an investment game, the cores discussed in the
previous subsections are di±cult to justify. An allocation x might not
be in the core if there is a blocking investment d such that v(d) > xd.
This means that a group of players can form an investment d that does
better than the share guaranteed by x. However, there is no reference
to what remains after investing d. It might be that the yield of the
remainder is so low that the total yield is less than the share guaranteed
by x.
Recall that, for every S µ N; QS is the n-dimensional vector which
coincides with Q on the coordinates that belong to S, and is equal
to zero otherwise. If a coalition S is not satis¯ed with the allocation
x, it means that it has a comprehensive investment (rather than a
partial one, as suggested by the core) of its entire resources, QS, that
9yields a higher payo® than xQS. By a comprehensive investment we
mean investments ci 2 F(QS), i = 1;:::;L, that satisfy
PL
i=1 ci = QS.
The coalition S of players has a justi¯ed claim against x using such
a comprehensive investment if xQS <
PL
i=1 v(ci). The comprehensive
core consists of all those allocations against which there is no justi¯ed
claim using a comprehensive investment. Formally,
De¯nition 8. The comprehensive core of a cooperative investment
game (v;Q), denoted C ¡ core(v;Q), is the set of vectors x = (x1;:::;xn)
such that
(1) xQ = v(Q); and
(2) xQS ¸
PL
i=1 v(ci) for any coalition S µ N and for any invest-
ment ci 2 F(QS), i = 1;:::;L, that satisfy
PL
i=1 ci = QS.
It is not hard to see that core(v;Q) µ C ¡ core(v;Q). The following
example shows that core(v;Q) might be empty while C ¡ core(v;Q)
not.
Example 3.
Let n = 2; Q = (1;1); v(Q) = 2; v((1;1=2)) = 3, v((0;t)) = ¡2t for
0 · t · 1=2 and v(c) = 0 otherwise. We have that Q = (1;1=2)+1
2(0;1)
but v(Q) = 2 < 3 = v((1;1=2)) + 1
2v((0;1)), so by Theorem 1 the core
of (v;Q) is empty. On the other hand, x = (1;1) is in C ¡ core(v;Q).
When players 1 and 2 consider forming the mixed coalition (1;1=2),
player 2 is left with an excess amount of 1=2. Any way he might cuts
this amount into pieces yields ¡1. Thus, the net value is 2, which is
what is given to this coalition by x.
Theorem 3. The comprehensive core of an investment game (v;Q) is
not empty if and only if v(Q) = DaSav(Q).
Proof. Assume ¯rst that C ¡ core(v;Q) 6= ; and let x 2 C ¡ core(v;Q).
Assume that
P
SµN ¸SQS = Q where ¸S ¸ 0 S µ N, and for every S µ
N, let ci
S 2 F(QS); i = 1;:::;LS, be such that
PLS
i=1 ci
S = QS. Then







S). This implies that
v(Q) = DaSav(Q).
Conversely, assume that v(Q) = DaSav(Q) holds. We de¯ne the
auxiliary (classic) cooperative game (N;vN) by vN(S) = Sav(QS) for
any S µ N. We will show that (N;vN) has a non-empty core. Indeed,
by the Shapley-Bondareva theorem (Bondareva [5] or Shapley [11]) it is
su±cient to check that if
P
SµN ¸SIS = IN where ¸S ¸ 0 S µ N, then
10P
SµN ¸SvN(S) · vN(N). Notice that
P
SµN ¸SIS = IN is equivalent
to
P
SµN ¸SQS = Q. By the assumption, if
P
SµN ¸SQS = Q then P
SµN ¸SvN(S) =
P
SµN ¸SSav(QS) · v(Q) · Sav(Q) = vN(N).
Therefore, the core of (N;vN) is not empty. Let x be an element in the
















i ¸ vN(S) = Sav(QS); 8S µ N:
It follows that y 2 C ¡ core(v;Q).
One may wonder weather the condition DaSav(Q) = v(Q) in the
above Theorem 3 can be replaced by the condition Dav(Q) = Sav(Q) =
v(Q). The following example shows that this is not the case.
Example 4.
Let n = 3; Q = (1;1;1), and de¯ne v(Q) = 3; v((1;1;0)) =
v((1;0;1)) = v((0;1;1)) = 2; v((1=2;1=2;0)) = 1+" and v(c) = 0 oth-
erwise. Then it is easy to check that Dav(Q) = Sav(Q) = 3 = v(Q).
However, DaSav(Q) = 3 + ". By Theorem 3, C ¡ core(v;Q) = Á.
4. Market games
4.1. Subgames.
Suppose that the coalition d 2 F(Q) is formed. Within d the worth of
each coalition is still determined by the same v. Formally, d induces a
new population game, called a subgame.
De¯nition 9. Let (v;Q) be a population game and ¯x some d 2 F(Q).
The subgame of (v;Q) with respect to d is (vd;d), where for every
c 2 F(d); vd(c) = v(c).
Proposition 1. Let (v;Q) be a population game. Then,
(1) For any coalition d 2 F(Q), the core of the subgame (vd;d) is
not empty i® SSav(d) = v(d).
(2) The core of every subgame of (v;Q) is not empty i® v is SSA
on F(Q).
The proof is postponed to the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Let (v;Q) be a population game. Then,
11(1) For any coalition d 2 F(Q), the split core of the subgame (vd;d)
is not empty i® SSav(d) = Sav(d).
(2) The split core of every subgame of (v;Q) is not empty i® Sav
is SSA on F(Q).
The proof is postponed to the Appendix.
Proposition 3. Let (v;Q) be an investment game. Then,
(1) For any investment d 2 F(Q), the comprehensive core of the
subgame (vd;d) is not empty i® DaSav(d) = v(d).
(2) The comprehensive core of every subgame of (v;Q) is not empty
i® DaSav = v on F(Q).
Proof. This is a consequence of Theorem 3.
4.2. Market games.
Consider a situation where there are many ¯rms in the economy. A ¯rm
is characterized by an initial endowment and a production function.
There are n types of ¯rms. The initial endowment of ¯rms of type i
(i = 1;:::;n) is a bundle of production factors wi 2 I R
`
+. Firms can
produce one type of good from the ` production factors. Firms of type
i produce by a production function ui : I R
`
+ ! I R that satis¯es: (i)
ui(0) = 0; and (ii) there is a constant Mi such that for every c either
ui(c) · Mi or ui(c) · jcjMi . Nothing like monotonicity or concavity
is required.
Suppose that there is a continuum of ¯rms of each type, and that
Qi > 0 is some measurement of the number of ¯rms of type i (i =
1;:::;n). A coalition that consists of ci type-i ¯rms is denoted by
c = (c1;:::;cn). The entire endowment of c is wc =
Pn
i=1 ciwi.
In order to maximize production this endowment is split among the
¯rms. That is, wc is split into bundles yi
k 2 I R
l
+ (1 · i · n; 1 ·






k = wc and
PKi
k=1 °i
k = ci for every
i = 1;:::;n. This means that type-i ¯rms are split into Ki groups,
such that group k is of size °i
k, and each ¯rm in group k receives the
bundle yi







We de¯ne a game in which the value of a coalition c is the maximum
achievable production.
De¯nition 10. The market game induced by Q = (Q1;:::;Qn) and
fwi;uign


























i; i = 1;:::;n
ª
:
(The obvious constraints °i
k ¸ 0 and yi
k 2 I R
`
+ are omitted.)























kjMi) · (jcj + jwcj)Mi: Thus, v(c) · (jcj + jwcj)Mi:
(2) If ui is continuous and concave, there is a constant Mi such that
for every c either ui(c) · Mi or ui(c) · jcjMi. Indeed, when ui is
continuous, there is M1
i such that ui(c) · M1
i when jcj · 1. Let
M2
i be the maximum of ui over ¢. Then, by concavity, if jcj ¸ 1,
ui(c) · jcjM2
i ¡ ui(0). Set, Mi = max(M1
i ;M2
i + jui(0)j):





k is required to be less than or equal to, but not neces-
sarily equal to wc. Thus, we allow for free disposal of excessive quan-
tity. It is therefore clear that v(0) = 0 and that v is monotonically
non-decreasing.
Lemma 2. Every market game has a non-empty core.
Proof. Let (v;Q) be the market game induced by Q and fwi;uign
i=1.
By Theorem 1 it is su±cient to show that SSav(Q) = v(Q). Fix
" > 0 and suppose that SSav(Q) ·
PL
j=1 ¸jv(cj) + " for some in-
teger L;
PL
j=1 ¸jcj = Q; ¸j > 0; cj 2 F(Q); j = 1;:::;L. Fur-























































j;k) + 2" · v(Q) + 2":




























13It follows that SSav(Q) · v(Q) + 2" for any " > 0, and therefore,
SSav(Q) = v(Q). This shows that the core of (v;Q) is not empty.
It is clear that any sub-game of a market game is also a market
game. We conclude that if (v;Q) is a market game then each one of its
sub-games has a non-empty core. The following example shows that
there are games such that each of their subgames has a non-empty core,
while they are not market games.
Example 5.
Let Q = 1 and v(t) = t2 for every 0 · t · Q. Clearly, v is SSA.
Therefore, the core of any subgame of v is not empty. If v is a mar-
ket game, the coalition Q can reallocate the initial endowments of its
members so as to produce the quantity 1. The coalition Q=2, which
has half of the resources that Q has, can reallocate these resources in
precisely the same proportions as Q did, and produce in a similar way.
By so doing, coalition Q=2 may produce half of the production of Q,
which is 1=2 > v(Q=2) = 1=4: Thus, v cannot be a market game.
De¯nition 11. The game (v;Q) is homogeneous if v is a homogeneous
function on F(Q). That is v(¸c) = ¸v(c) whenever c;¸c 2 F(Q).
When the game is homogeneous, the worth of any coalition c is
jcjv( c
jcj); which is the worth of a coalition whose size is 1 and its internal
distribution is c
jcj multiplied by the size of c.
Remark 2. When (v;Q) is homogeneous, the function uv;Q coincides
with v on ¢. Moreover, if (v;Q) is homogeneous then uv;Q uniquely
determines v on F(Q) via the equation v(c) = jcjuv;Q( c
jcj).
Remark 3. If v is homogeneous, then Sav = SSav
Example 6.
For any q = (q1;:::;qn) 2 ¢ let e(q) = ¡
Pn
i=1 qi log(qi) be the
entropy of the distribution q. Fix some positive Q 2 I R
n, and consider
the homogeneous game (v;Q) de¯ned by v(c) = jcje( c
jcj) for c 2 F(Q).
(v;Q) re°ects a situation where heterogenous coalitions do better than
homogenous ones. Since v is concave on ¢ and is monotonically non-
decreasing on F(Q), by Theorem 4 below, (v;Q) is a market game.
Lemma 3. Every market game is homogeneous.
14Proof. Since (v;Q) is a market game, by Lemma 2 and by Proposition
1, v is SSA on F(Q). Therefore, if c 2 F(Q) and 0 · ¸ · 1, then
v(¸c) · ¸v(c). To obtain the inverse inequality, ¯x " > 0 and let
f°i
k;yi



























k) ¸ ¸v(c) ¡ ". Since this is true for
every " > 0, we get that v(¸c) ¸ ¸v(c) and therefore v is homogeneous.
As illustrated by Example 5, the fact that any subgame has a non-
empty core does not guarantee that the game is a market game. It
turns out that the characterization of market games also requires ho-
mogeneity. This is formally stated in the following analogy of Shapley
and Shubik's theorem [13]:
Theorem 4. (v;Q) is a market game if and only if:
(i) v is monotonically non-decreasing on F(Q);
(ii) (v;Q) is homogeneous; and
(iii) Every subgame of (v;Q) has a non-empty core.
Proof. The claim, that if (v;Q) is a market game any of its subgames
has a non-empty core is due to Lemma 2 and to the fact that any
subgame of a market game is itself a market game. The homogeneity
of v is due to Lemma 3. It is also clear by the de¯nition of a market
game that v is non-decreasing on F(Q).
Now suppose that every subgame of (v;Q) has a non-empty core and
that v is a homogeneous non-decreasing function on F(Q). We show
that (v;Q) is a market game. Let wi be the i-th standard basis vector
of I R
n, and ui = v, i = 1;:::;n (notice that we take ` = n).
Denote by (r;Q) the market game induced by Q and fwi;vgn
i=1. It
remains to prove that r = v on F(Q). By the monotonicity of v and


























i; i = 1;:::;n
ª
(notice that the monotonicity of v enables us to replace the inequality
in the de¯nition of a market game with equality). Since every such
partition of c is possible also in the de¯nition of SSav(c), we have that
r · SSav. However, by Proposition 1, and since every subgame of
15(v;Q) has a non-empty core, v is SSA. Therefore, by Lemma 9 (7) in
the Appendix, SSav = v, and so r · SSav = v.
To show that r ¸ v, recall that r is homogeneous because (r;Q) is a
market game and that v is homogeneous by assumption. Therefore we
can assume w.l.o.g. that ¢ µ F(Q). Fix c 2 ¢ and for i = 1;:::;n
take Ki = 1; °i = ci and yi = c. Then by the de¯nition of r, r(c) ¸ Pn
i=1 civ(c) = v(c). It follows that r = v on ¢ and by homogeneity
r = v on F(Q). Therefore, (v;Q) = (r;Q) is a market game.
4.3. More about homogeneous population games.
Proposition 4. Let (v;Q) be a homogeneous game. The following are
equivalent:
(1) Every subgame of (v;Q) has a non-empty core.
(2) v is SA on F(Q).
(3) v is concave on F(Q).
Proof. (1) ) (2) By proposition 1, if every subgame of (v;Q) has a
non-empty core then v is SSA. In particular, v is SA.
(2) ) (3) If c;d 2 F(Q) and ® 2 (0;1) then v(®c + (1 ¡ ®)d) ¸
v(®c) + v((1 ¡ ®)d) = ®v(c) + (1 ¡ ®)v(d) so v is concave.
(3) ) (1) For c;d 2 F(Q) with c + d 2 F(Q) we have, by the
concavity and homogeneity of v, 1
2v(c+d) = v(c+d
2 ) ¸ 1
2v(c)+ 1
2v(d) so
v is SA. By Remark 3, v is SSA and by Proposition 1 every subgame
of (v;Q) has a non-empty core.
Remark 4. When (v;Q) satis¯es conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of The-
orem 4 we can say more than that (v;Q) is a market game. Indeed, by
the proof of Theorem 4, it follows that (v;Q) is a market game where the
production functions of all the ¯rms in the economy are homogeneous.
Moreover, by Proposition 4 all the production functions are concave.
Proposition 5. Every homogeneous game has a non-empty split-core.
Proof. This is a consequence of Theorem 2 and Remark 3.
Recall Example 2 that shows a homogeneous game whose core is
empty.
5. Convex population games
De¯nition 12. The population game (v;Q) is convex if, whenever
s;t;d and t + d are coalitions such that s · t, it follows that v(s +
d) ¡ v(s) · v(t + d) ¡ v(t):
16In classic cooperative games, the game (N;v) is convex if v(S [T)¡
v(S) ¸ v(T) ¡ v(S \ T) (this is due to Shapley, 1971). This means
that the marginal contribution of any subset of players is monotone
increasing with respect to the containment order on the coalitions.
De¯nition 12 above is the analogues in the case of population games:
When a population game is convex, the contribution of an additional
coalition d is larger when it is being added to a larger existing coalition.
Recently, Branzei et al. [6] de¯ned convexity of a fuzzy game in a
slightly di®erent way. However, our de¯nition and theirs are equivalent.
In their paper, it is shown that the core of a convex population game
(v;Q) is not empty. Moreover, when (v;Q) is convex, the core of (v;Q)
coincides with the core of the (convex) cooperative game, which is the
restriction of v to the vertices of the cube F(Q) (here it is assumed
that all the coordinates of Q equal 1).
In this section, we discuss other properties of convex population
games that, to the best of our knowledge, have not appeared else-
where. The ¯rst question arises is whether convexity of the population
game (v;Q) is equivalent to convexity of v as a function on F(Q). The
following lemma has the answer.
Lemma 4. (i) If n = 1 then convexity of v on [0;Q] is equivalent to
convexity of the game (v;Q).
(ii) For n ¸ 2, convexity of v on F(Q) does not imply and is not
implied by convexity of the game (v;Q).
Proof. (i) This is a consequence of the equivalence of our de¯nition and
that of Branzei et al. [6].
(ii) We start with an example where the game (v;Q) is convex but v
is not convex on F(Q). Let Q = (1;1) and de¯ne v(c1;c2) = ¡c1(1¡c2)







2v((1;0)) (actually, v is concave
on ¢). However, the game (v;Q) is convex. Indeed, a little bit of
algebra gives v(t + d) ¡ v(t) = t1d2 + d1t2 ¡ d1 + d1d2. Similarly,
v(s + d) ¡ v(s) = s1d2 + d1s2 ¡ d1 + d1d2. Therefore, if t ¸ s then
v(t + d) ¡ v(t) ¸ v(s + d) ¡ v(s).
On the other hand, let Q = (2;2) and de¯ne v(c1;c2) = (c1 ¡ c2)2
for any c 2 F(Q). Then obviously v is a convex function. De¯ne
s = (0;1); t = (0;2); d = (2;0). Then s · t but v(s + d) ¡ v(s) = 0 >
¡4 = v(t + d) ¡ v(t). Therefore, (v;Q) is not convex.
Example 7.
17Let f be a convex real function de¯ned on R and let Q be a positive
vector in Rn. De¯ne v(c) = f(jcj) for every c 2 F(Q). Then (v;Q) is
a convex game. This is a simple application of the previous Lemma 4
(i).
We move on to discuss continuity of convex population games. By
the previous lemma, convexity of (v;Q) does not imply that v is a
convex function. Therefore, a matter of interest is whether convexity
of (v;Q) guarantees continuity of v on F(Q). The following example
shows that, in general, convex games need not be continuous.
Example 8.
Let Q = (1;:::;1).
(1) De¯ne v(c) = ¡1 for every c 2 F(Q) n L, where L is the line
connecting 0 with the point (0;:::;0;1) and v(c) = 0 for every
c 2 L. (v;Q) is convex and not continuous.
(2) De¯ne v(c) = 0 for every c 2 F(Q) n L, where L is the line
connecting (1;:::;1; 1
2) with Q and v(c) = 1 for every c 2 L.
(v;Q) is convex and not continuous.
Lemma 5. Let (v;Q) be a bounded convex game.
(1) Suppose that c is in F(Q) . For every " > 0 there is ± > 0 such
that if c · d and jd ¡ cj < ± then v(d) · v(c) + ".
(2) Suppose that d is in F(Q). For every " > 0 there is ± > 0 such
that if c · d and jd ¡ cj < ± then v(d) ¸ v(c) ¡ ".
(3) If c is in the interior of F(Q), then there is a neighborhood
U µ F(Q) of c such that for every " > 0 there is ± > 0 such
that if c0 2 U, c0 · d (resp. c0 ¸ d) and jd ¡ c0j < ±, then
v(d) · v(c0) + " (resp. v(d) ¸ v(c0) ¡ ").
Proof. We prove (1). Let c be in F(Q) and let " > 0. Suppose in
contradiction to the lemma, that there is a sequence dn such that dn &
c and v(dn) > v(c) + " for every n = 1;2;:::. De¯ne en = dn ¡
c. Because of convexity, it can be shown by induction that for every
integer k, v(c + ken) ¡ v(c) ¸ k(v(c + en) ¡ v(c)) ¸ k", provided
that c + ken 2 F(Q). However, since c + en is in F(Q) and en ! 0,
for every k there is n such that c + ken 2 F(Q). This means that
v(c + ken) ¸ k" + v(c), which contradicts the boundness of v. This
proves (1). A similar idea proves (2).
18As for (3), if c is the interior of F(Q), there is a neighborhood U
of c which is bounded away from the boundary of F(Q). Thus, for
every integer k, there is ± > 0 such that when e 2 F(Q) satis¯es
jej < ±, then for every c0 2 U, c0 + ke and c0 ¡ ke both are in F(Q).
This implies that k(v(c0 + e) ¡ v(c0)) · v(c0 + ke) ¡ v(c0). Therefore,
v(c0 + e) ¡ v(c0) ·
v(c0+ke)¡v(c0)
k · 2M
k , where ¡M · v · M: Since 2M
k
goes to zero as k goes to in¯nity, (3) is proven.
Proposition 6.
(1) A bounded convex game is continuous in the interior of F(Q).
(2) If a bounded convex game is continuous in 0 and Q, then it is
continuous in F(Q).
Proof. (1) Let c be in the interior of F(Q). Lemma 5 states that if
qn & c or qn % c, then v(qn) ! v(c). Fix " > 0 and let qn be a
sequence that converges to c, where neither c · qn nor c ¸ qn hold.
Lemma 5 (3) ensures the existence of a neighborhood U around c
with the property that there is ± > 0 such that if c0 2 U, c0 · d and
jd¡c0j < ±, then v(d) · v(c0)+". Since qn ! c, for su±ciently large3 n,
min(c;qn) 2 U, jc ¡ min(c;qn)j < ±, jqn ¡ min(c;qn)j < ± and qn 2 U.
Thus, v(c) · v(min(c;qn)) + " and v(qn) · v(min(c;qn)) + ". Since
qn 2 U (now qn plays the role of c0 and min(c;qn) plays the role of d in
Lemma 5 (3)) v(c) ¸ v(min(c;qn)) ¡ " and v(qn) ¸ v(min(c;qn)) ¡ ".
Thus, jv(c) ¡ v(min(c;qn))j · " and jv(qn) ¡ v(min(c;qn))j · " which
implies that jv(qn) ¡ v(c)j · 2". This completes the proof of (1).
As for (2), notice ¯rst that if (v;Q) is convex then, for any d ¸ c in
F(Q), the game (vc;d;d¡c) de¯ned by vc;d(e) = v(c+e) is also convex.
Therefore, (1) ensures that v is continuous in the relative interior of
every facet.
The proof of (2) is by induction on the dimension of the game, n.
If n = 1, then by Lemma 4 (i), convexity of (v;Q) implies that v is
convex, and a convex function is continuous if it is continuous in the
boundary. Assume that (2) holds for every game of dimension less than
n and we prove the assertion for n.
Let F be a facet of F(Q). There are c and d such that F = fe; c ·
e · dg. In order to show continuity of v in F it is enough to show
continuity of v in c and d. Let e be a coalition such that c + e 2 F.
3max(s;t) (min(s;t)) is the coalition whose i-th coordinate is the maximum
(minimum) of si and ti.
19Due to convexity of (v;Q),
v(e) · v(c + e) ¡ v(c) · v(Q) ¡ v(Q ¡ e): (1)
However, if jej is su±ciently small, then both sides of (1) are close to
zero. This proves continuity at c. Continuity at d is shown in a similar
way.
Now, let two coalitions c and d be in the boundary of F(Q). If c and
d are su±ciently close to each other, then there is a point e which is
in the same facet as c and in the same facet (possibly di®erent) as d.
Furthermore, e is close to both c and d. Thus, continuity of v in every
facet implies continuity within the boundary of F(Q).
It remains to show that if c is in the boundary and d is in the interior
and both are close to each other, then v(c) and v(d) are close. Since c
is in the boundary, either min(c;d) or max(c;d) is in the boundary. If
q = min(c;d) is in the boundary, then
v(d ¡ q) · v(d) ¡ v(q) · v(Q) ¡ v(Q ¡ d + q): (2)
Thus, when d is su±ciently close to c, d ¡ q is close to zero and the
two sides of (2) are close to zero. Therefore, v(d) must be close to v(q).
Since q and c are in the boundary, v(q) and v(c) are close to each other,
which shows that v(d) and v(c) are close to each other.
The proof is similar when max(c;d) is in the boundary. Thus, v is
continuous, as required.
It is clear that any sub-game of a convex game is convex and there-
fore, any sub-game of a convex game has a non-empty core. It implies
that, if (v;Q) is convex, then v is SSA. A natural question is whether
the inverse, namely whether strong super additivity implies convexity,
is correct. The following example shows that the answer is no.
Example 9.





t=2; if 0 · t · 1=4;
3t=2 ¡ 1=4; if 1=4 · t · 1=2;
t; if 1=2 · t · 1:
v is SSA (and continuous) but not convex on [0;1]. Therefore, by
Lemma 4 (i), (v;Q) is not a convex game.
206. Exact population games
The following de¯nition is due to Schmeidler [9].
De¯nition 13. The cooperative game (N;v) is exact if for every coali-




This de¯nition has its natural counterpart in the context of population
games:
De¯nition 14. (v;Q) is an exact population game if for every c 2
F(Q) there exists x 2 core(v;Q) such that xc = v(c).
The following proposition characterizes exact population games.
Proposition 7. (v;Q) is an exact population game i® the following
conditions hold:
(1) v is concave on F(Q).
(2) v is homogeneous on F(Q).
(3) v(®c + (1 ¡ ®)Q) = ®v(c) + (1 ¡ ®)v(Q) for any c 2 F(Q) and
for any ® 2 (0;1).
Proof. Assume that (1)-(3) hold. By rescaling, if needed, we can as-
sume that ¢ µ F(Q). For any q 2 ¢ denote by q¡n the n ¡ 1 di-
mensional vector consisting of the ¯rst n ¡ 1 coordinates of q. Thus,
the n-th coordinate of q, qn, is equal to 1 ¡ jq¡nj. Consider the set
D = f(q;t); q¡n 2 ¢; t < v(q)g. Fix c 2 ¢ and de¯ne L =




jQj)); ® 2 [0;1]g. L is the line con-




jQj)). L is a convex set in I R
n, and
since v is concave, D is also a convex set. Furthermore, the interior of
D is not empty.
Fix ¯ 2 (0;1) and let ® 2 (0;1) be such that ¯ = ®
j®c+(1¡®)Qj. Notice
that 1 ¡ ¯ =
(1¡®)jQj
j®c+(1¡®)Qj. By conditions (2) and (3),
v
µ






®c + (1 ¡ ®)Q




v(®c + (1 ¡ ®)Q)
j®c + (1 ¡ ®)Qj






The above equality implies that the sets D and L are disjoint. More-
over, the line segment L is on the boundary of D. The separation theo-
rem ensures that there is a hyperplane in Rn that separates L from D,
21and since L is on the boundary of D, it follows that L is contained in
this hyperplane. This implies that there is a vector x 2 I R
n such that
xq ¸ v(q) for every q 2 ¢ with equality for every q 2 L. In particular it
means that x is in core(v;Q) and that xc = v(c). Therefore, we proved
the assertion for any c 2 ¢. However, since (v;Q) is homogeneous it
is easy to see that it will hold for any c 2 F(Q).
As for the converse, assume that (v;Q) is exact. Let c;d 2 F(Q)
and ¯x ® 2 (0;1). Let x 2 core(v;Q) be such that x(®c + (1 ¡ ®)d) =
v(®c + (1 ¡ ®)d). Then ®v(c) + (1 ¡ ®)v(d) · ®xc + (1 ¡ ®)xd =
x(®c + (1 ¡ ®)d) = v(®c + (1 ¡ ®)d), so v is concave.
Next, we show that v is homogeneous. Fix c 2 F(Q) and ® > 0
such that ®c 2 F(Q). Let x;y 2 core(v;Q) be such that xc = v(c) and
y®c = v(®c). Since both x and y are in the core, xc = v(c) · yc and
®xc ¸ v(®c) = ®yc. It follows that v(®c) = ®v(c).
Finally, for some c 2 F(Q) and ® 2 (0;1), let x;y 2 core(v;Q)
be such that xc = v(c) and y(®c + (1 ¡ ®)Q) = v(®c + (1 ¡ ®)Q).
Then ®v(c) + (1 ¡ ®)v(Q) = ®xc + (1 ¡ ®)xQ ¸ v(®c + (1 ¡ ®)Q) =
®yc + (1 ¡ ®)yQ ¸ ®v(c) + (1 ¡ ®)v(Q), so we have an equality.
Proposition 8. Suppose that there are n algebraically independent
coalitions c1;:::;cn such that
(i) ci >> 0, i = 1;:::;n;
(ii) the subgame (vci;ci) is exact, i = 1;:::;n; and
(iii) Q = c1.
Then, v is linear: v(d) = xd for some x 2 I R
n.
Proof. Without loss of generality the standard simplex, ¢, is a subset
of F(Q). Since (v;Q) is exact, by Proposition 7, v is homogenous.
Thus, in order to prove the proposition, it is enough to prove that v is
linear in ¢.
We ¯rst claim that for every i = 1;:::;n and for every d 2 ¢, v is
linear in the interval between
ci
jcij and d. Indeed, since ci >> 0, there
is " > 0 such that ci >> "d: By assumption, the subgame (vci;ci)
















j¯ci+(1¡¯)"djv(d): This implies linearity in the in-
terval between
ci
jcij and d because
¯jcij
j¯ci+(1¡¯)"dj is onto (0;1), as a function
of ¯.









i=1 ®i = 1
and ®i ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;n. This is a simple consequence (by induction)





Now, let d 2 ¢. Since c1;:::;cn are independent, there are coe±cients




Furthermore, this representation of d as a linear combination of the
ci
jcijs is unique. Since all
ci
jcij are in ¢, the sum of the coe±cients is 1.
>From here on the proof follows an induction on the number of neg-
ative coe±cients. If this number is 0, then d 2 C, a case that has been
proven above. Now suppose that if the number of negative coe±cients




jcij). We prove this assertion when
the number of negative coe±cients is k.
We know that for every j = 1;:::;n and ¯ 2 (0;1), v(¯
cj
jcjj + (1 ¡
¯)d) = ¯v(
cj
jcjj) + (1 ¡ ¯)v(d). However, if °j < 0 and ¯ is su±ciently
close to 1, the number of negative coe±cients of ¯
cj
jcjj + (1 ¡ ¯)d =
P
i6=j(1 ¡ ¯)°i ci
jcij +
¡
¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)°j¢ cj
jcjj is k ¡ 1. Thus, when ¯ is
su±ciently close to 1, ¯v(
cj















Corollary 1. The subgame (vc;c) is exact for any c 2 F(Q) i® v is
linear: v(d) = xd for some x 2 I R
n.
Remark 5. In classic cooperative games, the game (N;v) is convex if
and only if each of his subgames is exact. However, in this new model,
the fact that every subgame of the game (v;Q) is exact is stronger than
convexity of (v;Q). Indeed, by Corollary 1 every subgame of (v;Q) is
exact i® v is linear on F(Q).
7. Additive population games
When a game is additive, the contribution of any type to the total
worth of a coalition is independent of the amount of players of other
types in the coalition. This is when there is no external e®ects of the
presence of players of other types. Formally,
De¯nition 15. (v;Q) is an additive population game if there exist
functions gi : I R ! I R; i = 1;2;:::;n, such that gi(0) = 0; i = 1;:::;n,
and for any coalition c = (c1;:::;cn) 2 F(Q); v(c) =
Pn
i=1 gi(ci).
23The special structure enables us to provide a simpler characterization
of additive games with non-empty core.
Proposition 9. Let (v;Q) be an additive game with g1;:::;gn corre-
sponding to it. The following are equivalent:





Qi for every 0 < t < Qi and for every i = 1;:::;n.
Proof. (2 ) 1) for i = 1;:::;n de¯ne xi =
gi(Qi)
Qi . Then xQ = v(Q)








ci ci = v(c), so
x 2 core(v;Q).
(1 ) 2) Let x 2 core(v;Q) and assume that (2) doesn't hold. Then





Consider the coalition d de¯ned by di = ~ t and dj = Qj for any j 6= i.










































Rearranging the terms in (5) gives xiQi < gi(Qi). However, this is
impossible because one can consider the coalition whose ith coordinate
equals Qi and all other coordinates equal 0. Thus, we got the desired
contradiction.
8. Discussion and final comments
8.1. Another possible de¯nition of market games. When (v;Q)
is interpreted as an investment game, there are only n individuals in-
teracting as and not a continuum of players. These individuals might
be ¯rms that combine forces for a joint production. Suppose that ¯rm
i has an initial endowment Qiwi (Qi is a number and wi 2 I R
`
+) and
a production function ui. When ¯rm i invests ciwi (ci · Qi) we say
that the investment is c = (c1;:::;cn). In this case the total endowment
24is wc =
Pn
i=1 ciwi. By splitting this endowment as
Pn
i=1 di = wc, the
investment c can produce
Pn
i=1 ui(di). The value of c is therefore the
maximal achievable production. Formally,
De¯nition 16. The investment-market game induced by Q = (Q1;:::;Qn)
and fwi;uign





i=1 di · wc
ª
:
It turns out that in order for an investment-market game to have
a non-empty core, the production functions should be strongly super-
additive (SSA):
Lemma 6. If all the production functions ui are SSA, then the investment-
market game induced by Q = (Q1;:::;Qn) and fwi;uign
i=1 has a non-
empty core.
The proof appears in the Appendix. Similar to Theorem 4 we obtain,
Proposition 10. (v;Q) is an investment-market game with strongly
super-additive production functions i® the core of any subgame of (v;Q)
is non-empty and v is non-decreasing.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4 and is therefore omitted.
8.2. Weakly convex games. Another possible extension of the de¯-
nition of cooperative convex games to investment games is the follow-
ing:
De¯nition 17. A game (v;Q) is weakly convex if for every two coali-
tions s and t,
v(s) + v(t) · v(max(s;t)) + v(min(s;t)):
It seems that this family of games deserves a separate investigation.
8.3. Non-atomic games. A non-atomic game is a triple (I;B;v),
where I is the unit interval, B is the Borel sigma-¯eld of subsets of I,
and v is a real function de¯ned over B that satis¯es (1) v(;) = 0; and
(2) if v(S) > 0 then there is T µ S, T 2 B, such that 0 < v(T) < v(S).
Let ¹i, i = 1;:::;n, be n measures on (I;B) such that ¹i and ¹j are
mutually singular whenever i 6= j. Denote ¹ = (¹1;¹2;:::;¹n). Let
f : Rn ! R be a function such that f(0) = 0. Then, v(S) = f ±¹(S) =
f(¹1(S);¹2(S);:::;¹n(S)) is a non-atomic game. Furthermore, since
any two measures are mutually singular, the range of the n-dimensional
measure (¹1;¹2;:::;¹n) is a cube, F(Q). Thus, the game v just de¯ned
25(with the set I of players and coalitions in B) induces a population
game (v;Q).
On the other hand, any population game induces an equivalent non-
atomic game similar to the one described above.
The advantage of the model of population games is that it is de¯ned
in a ¯nite Euclidian space which allows for a relatively simple analysis.
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269. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Denote by w(q) the right-hand side of the equality. First, it is
clear that w ¸ uv;Q on ¢. In addition, one can show that w is con-





i=1 ®i = 1, qi 2 ¢; ®i ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;n + 1, then by




i=1 ®iuv;Q(qi). It follows that w · Cavuv;Q. It is enough to con-
sider convex combinations of no more than n + 1 elements by the
Caratheodory theorem.
The following lemma relates properties of the game v with properties
of uv;Q.
Lemma 7. (i) If v is Lipschitz with constant K, then uv;Q is continuous
and bounded by K.
(ii) If v is bounded and is Lipschitz in a neighborhood of zero, then uv;Q
is bounded.
Proof. (i) Since v(0) = 0, we have jv(c)j = jv(c) ¡ v(0)j · Kjc ¡ 0j
for any c 2 F(Q), so uv;Q is bounded by K. To show that uv;Q is
continuous, ¯x " > 0 and let p;q 2 ¢ be such that jp ¡ qj < "
K. By




uv;Q(p)¡". De¯ne d = jcjq (if d is not in F(Q), take the minimal ± > 0
such that d = (jcj¡±)q 2 F(Q). Since p;q, are close the argument will
still hold). We have that jv(d) ¡ v(c)j · Kjd ¡ cj = Kjcjjq ¡ pj · "jcj.






jcj ¸ uv;Q(p) ¡ 2". By
symmetry we get that uv;Q is continuous.
(ii) Let ± > 0 be such that if jcj < ± then
jv(c)j
jcj · K where K is the
Lipschitz constant. If jcj ¸ ± then
v(c)
jcj · M
± where M is a constant
bounding v. It follows that
v(c)
jcj · maxfK; M
± g so uv;Q is bounded.
The following lemmas describe some of the properties of the opera-
tors Sa and SSa.
Lemma 8. Let v;v0 be two bounded functions on F(Q) with v(0) =
v0(0) = 0. Then
(1) v · Sav.
(2) If v · v0 then Sav · Sav0.
27(3) If v is SA, then v = Sav:
(4) Sav is SA on F(Q).
(5) Sav = SaSav.
(6) The in¯mum of any family of SA functions is SA.
(7) Sav = inffg; g ¸ v and g is SAg.
Lemma 9. Let v;v0 be two bounded functions on F(Q) with v(0) =
v0(0) = 0. Then
(1) v · SSav.
(2) If v · v0 then SSav · SSav0.
(3) If v is SSA, then v = SSav:
(4) SSav is SSA on F(Q).
(5) SSav = SSaSSav.
(6) The in¯mum of any family of SSA functions is SSA.
(7) SSav = inffg; g ¸ v and g is SSAg.
The proof of Lemma 8 is similar to that of Lemma 9 and is therefore
omitted.
Proof of Lemma 9:
(1) - (3) are clear. As for (4), ¯x c 2 F(Q) and assume that the equa-
tion
PL
j=1 ¸jcj = c holds where ¸j ¸ 0 and cj 2 F(c); j = 1;:::;L. Let
" > 0. By the de¯nition of SSav, for any j = 1;:::;L, there exist in-
vestments cj1;:::;cjKj in F(cj) and non-negative numbers ®j1;:::;®jKj
such that
PKj
i=1 ®jicji = cj and
PKj
























¸j®jiv(cji) · " + SSav(c):




i=1 ¸j®jicji = c.
Since " > 0 is arbitrary we have (4).
(5) follows from (3) and (4). To prove (6) let fg®g®2I be a family
of SSA functions and de¯ne w = inf®2I g®. Assume that the equation PL
j=1 ¸jcj = c holds where ¸j ¸ 0 and cj 2 F(c); j = 1;:::;L. Then





28Since this is true for every ~ ® we get that w(c) ¸
PL
j=1 ¸jw(cj), so w is
SSA.
(7) follows from the previous claims. Indeed, denote w = inffg; g ¸
v and g is SSAg. By (4), SSav is SSA on F(Q) and by (1) it is above
v. Therefore, w · SSav. On the other hand, if g is above v then by (2)
SSag ¸ SSav. If g is also SSA, then by (3) g = SSag ¸ SSav. Since
this is true for every such g, it follows that w ¸ SSav so w = SSav.
Proof of Proposition 1: (1) is a consequence of Theorem 1 (more
precisely, from the equivalence of Theorem 1 (1) and Theorem 1 (2))
when applied to the sub-game (vd;d).
As for (2), assume that the core of every sub-game is not empty. Then
by (1) v = SSav. By Lemma 9, v is SSA. On the other hand, if v is
SSA then v = SSav, which implies that any sub-game has a non-empty
core.
Proof of Proposition 2: (1) is a consequence of Theorem 2. To see
(2) notice that by (1) the split core of every sub-game is not empty i®
SSav = Sav on F(Q). However, this is equivalent to Sav being SSA.
Indeed, if SSav = Sav then by Lemma 9 Sav is SSA. Conversely, if Sav
is SSA then by the same lemma, SSaSav = Sav · SSav · SSaSav,
so we have Sav · SSav.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let (v;Q) be the investment-market game in-
duced by Q and fwi;uign
i=1. By Theorem 1 it is su±cient to show
that SSav(Q) = v(Q). Fix " > 0 and suppose that SSav(Q) · PL
j=1 ¸jv(cj) + " for some integer L;
PL
j=1 ¸jcj = Q; ¸j > 0; cj 2
F(Q); j = 1;:::;L. Furthermore, suppose that for every j = 1;:::;L
the vectors (dij)n







jwi and v(cj) · Pn







































i=1 Qiwi. It follows that SSav(Q) ·
29v(Q) + 2" for any " > 0, and therefore, SSav(Q) = v(Q). This shows
that the core of (v;Q) is not empty.
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